Michele Pasin / Quotes

Conceptualization vs state of affairs

..Referring to the example given, consider a different arrangement of blocks, where c is on the top of d, while a and b together form a separate stack standing on the table (Fig. 4). The corresponding structure would be different from the previous one, generating therefore a different conceptualization. Of course there is nothing wrong in such a view, if one is only interested in isolated snapshots of the block world. But the meanings of the terms used to denote the relevant relations are still the same, since they are invariant with respect to the possible configurations of blocks. In fact, in the metalanguage adopted in their book, Genesereth and Nilsson would use the same terms (on, above, clear, table) to denote the new conceptualization. We prefer to say in this case that the states of affairs are different, but the conceptualization is the same. The structure proposed by Genesereth and Nilsson seems to be more apt to represent a state of affairs rather than a conceptualization. [...] In order to capture such intuitions, the linguistic terms we have used to denote the relevant relations cannot be thought of as mere comments, informal extra-information. Rather, the formal structure used for a conceptualization should somehow account for their meaning. As the logico-philosophical literature teaches us, such a meaning cannot coincide with an extensional relation. Sticking to a set-theoretical framework, a standard way to approximate such meaning is to conceive it as an intension (intensional relation), taking inspiration from Montague semantics. This means that a single extensional relation is always relative to a possible world. [...] According to this intensional interpretation, a conceptualization accounts for the intended meanings of the terms used to denote the relevant relations. Such meanings are supposed to remain the same if the actual extensions of the relations change due to different states of affairs.

Saved 26 January 2015 / citeseerx.ist.psu.edu ↗

#meaning #conceptualization #affairs

The history of the moral feelings (man is to be made responsible for nothing)

The Fable of Discretionary Freedom.—The history of the feelings, on the basis of which we make everyone responsible, hence, the so-called moral feelings, is…

Human, All Too Human: A Book For Free Spirits #conduct #responsibility #nature #affairs

Problem of incompatible conceptualizations

Even with a uniform language, there may still be incompatible assumptions in the conceptualization. For example, in [Hayes 96] it is shown that two…

Where Are The Semantics In The Semantic Web? #representation #language #assumption #conceptualization

The Talking Heads experiment

The key insight of the Talking Heads experiment is that agents develop their own individual and internal way of categorising the world they see. While, at the…

Introducing Artificial Intelligence (Henry Brighton and Howard Selina) #language #communication #conceptualization #emergence #symbol-grounding

Agents must publicly declare their ontologies

The moment we accept the problem and grant that agents may not use the same terms to mean the same things, we need a way for an agent to discover what another…

Where Are The Semantics In The Semantic Web? #ontology #messages #task #specification #language #meaning

Concept drift in the humanities

Different versions of the same dataset show that concepts change their meaning over time, especially if the time gap is wide. Although not meaning exactly the…

Semantic Web For The Humanities #concept #meaning #century

Conscious thought makes content easy to explain

If you ask, How can a state of my brain have the content that Caesar crossed the Rubicon? it seems an impossibly difficult question. But if you ask, How can…

Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) #consciousness #intentionality #meaning