Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) / quote 119 of 138
Memories that refer to their own causes
The most biologically basic intentional phenomena, including perceptual experiences, intentions to do something, and memories, have a peculiar logical feature in their conditions of satisfaction. It is part of the conditions of satisfaction of, for example, my memory that I went on a picnic yesterday, that if I really remember the event, then the event itself must cause my memory of it. If we spell out the conditions of satisfaction of the memory, they are not just that the event occurred, but also that its occurrence caused the very memory that has the occurrence of the event as the rest of its conditions of satisfaction. We can describe this by saying that memories, intentions, and perceptual experiences are all causally self-referential. What this means is that the content of the state itself refers to the state in making a causal requirement. The conditions of satisfaction of the memory itself require that the memory be caused by the event remembered. The conditions of satisfaction of the intention require that the performance of the action represented in the content of the intention requires that that very intention should cause that performance. And so on through other cases. In this respect, intentions, memories, and perceptual experiences are different from beliefs and desires. We can spell out the difference as follows. If I believe that I went on a picnic yesterday, then the formal structure of my intentional state looks like this: Believe (I went on a picnic yesterday). But if I remember that I went on a picnic yesterday then the formal structure of my intentional state looks like this: Remember (I went on a picnic yesterday, and my going on a picnic caused this memory).