Michele Pasin / Quotes

Biological versus functionalist views of consciousness

Without going into the mathematical details here, Maguire shows that if we do in fact have completely integrated experiences, this form of information integration cannot be modeled computationally. Both the global workspace theory and the integrated information theory can in principle be implemented in a computer program. According to Ned Block there is nothing intrinsically biological about either of these theories. This is why they are called functionalist, because the underlying biology, or substrate, as it is called, is irrelevant. In contrast to the many varieties of functionalist and computationalist views of consciousness, the majority of which I have not mentioned here, there is a view of consciousness that is called “biological.” This school of thought holds that only machines having the right biology can have consciousness. John Searle and Ned Block are the most prominent theorists espousing the biological theory of consciousness. They answer the question of how unconscious pieces of meat produce consciousness by saying this takes place through specific, though poorly understood, neurobiological features of the brain. There is by now a vast literature on the neurobiological features of the brain that produce consciousness.

Saved 27 January 2018 / www.amazon.com ↗

#biological-naturalism #functionalism #consciousness #computation

Biological naturalism

Suppose an animal gets a shortage of water in its system. The shortage of water will cause “saline imbalances” in the system, because the ratio of salt to…

Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) #biological-naturalism #consciousness #brain #mind-body-problem

Consciousness and neurons, solidity and pistons

Think of it this way: roughly speaking, consciousness is to neurons as the solidity of the piston is to the metal molecules. Both consciousness and solidity…

Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) #consciousness #levels #biological-naturalism

Consciousness as a system-level biological feature

The worst mistake is to suppose that the common-sense distinction between mental states naïvely construed and physical states naïvely construed is an…

Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) #biological-naturalism #consciousness #brain

Materialism leaves something out

In this chapter I will present the most common arguments against materialism, concentrating on functionalism, because it is currently the most influential…

Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) #materialism #functionalism #consciousness #intentionality

Penrose: conventional computers cannot be conscious

Like Searle, Penrose argues that conventional computing machinery cannot support consciousness. A conscious mind requires very specific physical…

Introducing Artificial Intelligence (Henry Brighton and Howard Selina) #consciousness #computation #physics #mind

Demystifying intentionality through biology

We are speaking, as we did about consciousness, of a certain set of biological capacities of the mind. And it is best to start with the biological capacities…

Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) #intentionality #biological-naturalism #brain