Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) / quote 55 of 138
The charge of neuronal chauvinism
One slightly more technical objection that really did concern the identity theorists and indeed eventually forced a modification in their views was the accusation of “neuronal chauvinism.”16 If the claim of the identity theorists was that every pain is identical with a certain kind of neuronal stimulation, and every belief is identical with a certain type of brain state, then it seems that a being that did not have neurons or that did not have the right kind of neurons could not have pains and beliefs. But why can’t animals that have brain structures different from ours have mental states? And indeed, why couldn’t we build a machine that did not have neurons at all, but also had mental states? This objection led to an important shift in the identity theory from what came to be called “type-type identity theory” to “token-token identity theory.”