Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) / quote 120 of 138
The network and the background
Intentional states do not in general come in isolated units. If I believe, for example, that it is raining, I cannot just have that belief in isolation. I must believe, for example, that rain consists of drops of water, that these fall out of the sky, that they generally go down and not up, that they make the ground wet, that they come out of clouds in the sky, and so on more or less indefinitely. Of course, someone might have the belief that it is raining and lack some of these other beliefs, but in general it seems that the belief that it is raining is only the belief that it is because of its position in a “network” of beliefs and other intentional states. And we can think of the totality of one’s intentional states as forming an elaborate interacting network. We can even say that any intentional state only functions, that is it only determines its conditions of satisfaction, relative to the network of which it is a part. If I believe I own a car, I must also believe that cars are modes of transportation, that they are used on streets and highways, that they move about, that people can get in and out of cars, that cars are a kind of property that can be bought and sold, and so on. If you follow out the threads in the network, you eventually reach a set of abilities, ways of coping with the world, dispositions, and capacities generally that I collectively call the “Background.” For example, if I form the intention to go skiing I can do so only if I take for granted that I have the ability to ski, but the ability to ski is not itself an additional intention, belief, or desire. I hold the controversial thesis that intentional states in general require a background of nonintentional capacities in order to function all.