Mind: A Brief Introduction (John R. Searle) / quote 121 of 138
Intentionality is representation of conditions of satisfaction
I have given a very brief sketch of the formal structure of intentionality. We can summarize it as follows. For any intentional state, there is a distinction between the type of state it is, and its content. Where the content is a whole proposition, it will represent states of affairs in the world and it will do this with one of the three directions of fit, mind-to-world, world-to-mind, or null. Intentional states that have a non-null direction of fit are thus representations of their conditions of satisfaction. And given the network of intentionality, even those states that have the null direction of fit, and even those that do not have a whole propositional content, are still largely constituted by states that do have a non-null direction of fit. Thus if I am sorry that I stepped on your foot, I must believe that I did so and wish I had not done so. And if I admire Jimmy Carter I must have a set of beliefs and desires about Jimmy Carter. In general, intentionality is representation of conditions of satisfaction . The most biologically basic intentional states, those that relate animals directly to the environment, have a causally self-referential component in their conditions of satisfaction. Any intentional state can function, that is, it can determine conditions of satisfaction, only because of its position in a network of intentional states and against the background of pre-intentional capacities.