Beyond Zero and One (Andrew Smart) / quote 152 of 171
Infinitely many goals explain any behavior
The problem arises because we know that we are intentional systems—our goals are somehow real because we feel like we have goals. Other people might attribute different goals to us. For example, perhaps a Freudian might explain your neurotic behavior in terms of your unconscious desire to have sex with your mother. You are not aware of this goal, and yet your behavior can be explained in terms of pursuing this goal. The problem is that from an external viewpoint, there are infinitely many goals that can explain any person’s behavior equally well. You might explain your goals completely differently from the Freudian. Who is right? This is the fundamental problem with describing things, including one’s own self, as having intentions. Kant also argued this point when he said that we do not have privileged access to our own consciousness. All descriptions of intentions are derived from an observer-relative position. If that is the case, how did intentionality arise in the first place? Likewise, Dennett is extremely suspicious of our own powers of introspection about our own goals. In fact, he doubts that we are conscious at all.