The definition of mental concepts as signa rerum also provides the basis of a close interconnection of logic and epistemology as it is characteristic especially of the later Middle Ages. In conjunction with this, a redefinition of the notion of signification (significare) is taking place. For where the mental concepts, i.e., the acts of understanding (intellectus), are considered to be signs themselves, the Aristotelian definition of significare (signifying) as to constitute an understanding (constituere intellectum) can no longer be regarded as adequate. As a result, the terminology of ‘representation’ (repraesentatio, repraesentare, facere praesens), originally used mainly in epistemological contexts, achieves an increasing importance for logical semantics by being fused with the terminology of ‘signification’. [...] Significatio is shortly described as “presentation of some form to the intellect” (praesentatio alicuius formae ad intellectus)[44] or as “representation of a thing by means of a conventional vocal expression” (rei per vocem secundum placitum repraesentatio) (Peter of Spain, Summule logicales, 1972, 79).